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FREE TO DISCRIMINATE:
COLEMAN V. COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND LEAVES STATES WITH
AN INCENTIVE TO HIRE MEN OVER WOMEN
Courtney Newsom*
I. INTRODUCTION
Gender discrimination in the workplace comes in two forms:
unequal treatment and unequal opportunity.1 All too often, a remedy
to combat one perpetuates the other. For example, a law that combats
unequal opportunity by addressing the special needs of pregnant
women also perpetuates the view that women should be treated
differently than men—discriminatory treatment.2 Congress took
eight years to carefully construct the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 19933 (FMLA or “Act”), which it believed struck the perfect
balance between providing women with equal treatment and equal
opportunity in the workplace by including a self-care provision with
the family-care provisions.4 The Supreme Court, however, did not
agree.
The FMLA, when adopted, included four provisions.5 The first
three provisions are collectively referred to as the family-care
* J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Communication
Studies, December 2002, University of Tulsa. I am grateful to Daniel Straw and all of the Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review editors for their hard work and dedication. I am also grateful to my
parents and my husband for their support and understanding during this writing process.
1. Unequal treatment concerns the way in which women are treated as employees, such as
whether women are treated differently than men. Unequal opportunity concerns the ability of
women to participate in the workforce, including whether men are favored over women in hiring
decisions. See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1340 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (presenting the viewpoints of equal-treatment feminists and equal-opportunity
feminists).
2. H.R. REP. NO. 101-28, pt. 1, at 14 (1989).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (1993), declared unconstitutional by Coleman v. Court of
Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012).
4. Id. § 2601; Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1350 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 2612. In 2008, Congress added a fifth provision to the FMLA, which
requires employers to grant eligible employees up to twelve workweeks of leave if the employee
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provisions and require employers to provide eligible employees with
up to twelve workweeks of leave per year to care for a new child or
an ill family member.6 The fourth provision, referred to as the selfcare provision, requires employers to provide eligible employees
with up to twelve workweeks of leave per year when a serious health
condition makes the employee unable to perform the functions of his
or her position.7
In a 5–4 decision with no majority opinion, the Supreme Court
held in Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland8 that Congress did
not have the power to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity by
passing the self-care provision of the FMLA.9 In other words,
Congress could not grant an employee the right to sue his or her
employer for violations of the self-care provision if the employer was
a state or state entity.10 As a practical matter, Congress has the power
to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity only when the legislation
attempts to remedy or prevent due process or equal protection
violations.11 The Court did not believe that Congress had made
sufficient findings to justify a belief that the FMLA would serve to
perpetuate unequal opportunity for women if the Act only sought to
combat unequal treatment of women in the workplace —that is, if it
contained only the family-care provisions.12 The Court’s decision
stands in stark disagreement with its earlier opinion in Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,13 which held that
Congress had the power to abrogate the states’ immunity when it
passed the family-care provisions of the FMLA.14
This Comment argues that the plurality opinion in Coleman
ignored the express congressional findings used to justify the FMLA
has a qualifying exigency that arises because an immediate family member is on (or has been
called to) active duty in the armed forces. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D), declared unconstitutional by
Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012).
6. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(A)–(C).
7. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D), declared unconstitutional by Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md.,
132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012).
8. 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012) (plurality opinion).
9. Id. at 1338.
10. See id.
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; Seminole Tribe of Fl. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59–72
(1996) (establishing that Fourteenth Amendment is the only source of Congress’s power to
abrogate).
12. 26 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006).
13. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
14. Id. at 740.
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that the Court had previously confirmed in Hibbs. Part II outlines the
circumstances that brought Coleman to the Supreme Court. Part III
details the historical framework of the FMLA by exploring some of
the congressional findings that led to its passage and considering the
Supreme Court’s view of those findings in Hibbs. Part IV presents
the rationales of the competing Coleman opinions. Part V analyzes
the plurality opinion in Coleman, contrasting it against both the
dissenting opinion and the Hibbs majority opinion. Part VI concludes
that by taking away an employee’s ability to seek a monetary remedy
for a state’s violation of the self-care provision of the FMLA, the
Supreme Court has left the states with an incentive to hire men over
women, leaving the states economically free to discriminate in the
hiring process.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Daniel Coleman worked as executive director of procurement
and contract administration at the Maryland Court of Appeals.15 In
his sixth year of employment, Coleman requested sick leave “based
upon a documented medical condition.”16 The day after Coleman’s
request, one of his supervisors gave him the choice to either resign or
be terminated.17 Because the FMLA required the Maryland Court of
Appeals to grant Coleman the leave, Coleman sued his employer in
federal court for, inter alia, violating the Act.18
A U.S. district court in Maryland dismissed the suit after the
state asserted sovereign immunity despite the FMLA’s express
provision that it applies to “any employer (including a public
agency).”19 The district court based this decision in part on Fourth
Circuit precedent that held that the entire FMLA was an
unconstitutional abrogation of state sovereign immunity. 20 But the
Supreme Court had overruled that decision in Hibbs, at least insofar

15. Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 2010).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1332–33 (2012) (plurality
opinion).
19. Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, No. L-08-2464, 2009 WL 8400940, at *1 (D. Md.
May 7, 2009); 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2) (2006).
20. Coleman, 2009 WL 8400940, at *1.
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as the family-care provisions were concerned.21 Nevertheless, the
district court found there was “universal agreement of the Federal
Courts of Appeals” that Congress’s abrogation of “state sovereign
immunity with respect to the FMLA’s self-care provision” was
unconstitutional.22
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.23 The
court agreed with the four other circuits to address the issue, finding
that Congress could not constitutionally abrogate states’ sovereign
immunity in the self-care provision of the FMLA.24 The court
provided two reasons for its decision. First, the legislative history of
the FMLA showed that “gender discrimination was not a significant
motivation of Congress’s decision to include the self-care
provision.”25 Instead, “Congress included that provision to attempt to
alleviate the economic effect on employees and their families of job
loss due to sickness and also to protect employees from being
discriminated against because of their serious health problems.”26
Second, even if Congress had intended the self-care provision to
protect against gender discrimination, “Congress did not adduce any
evidence establishing a pattern of the states as employers
discriminating on the basis of gender in granting leave for personal
reasons.”27
III. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
A. The FMLA
The FMLA requires an employer to hold an eligible employee’s
job open for up to twelve weeks a year in the event that the employee
needs to take family or medical leave for one of the following:
(A) Because of the birth of a son or daughter of the
employee and in order to care for such son or daughter.

21. Id. at *2 (citing Lizzi v. Alexander, 255 F.3d 128 (4th Cir. 2001)). When analyzing the
FMLA, courts have distinguished the first three provisions (family-care) from the fourth
provision (self-care). See id. at *1.
22. Id. at *2. At that time, the Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits had addressed the issue. Id.
23. Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 194 (4th Cir. 2010).
24. Id. at 193. At the time of the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the Fifth Circuit had joined the
Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits’ reasoning on this issue. Id. at 194
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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(B) Because of the placement of a son or daughter with the
employee for adoption or foster care.
(C) In order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or
parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or
parent has a serious health condition.
(D) Because of a serious health condition that makes the
employee unable to perform the functions of the position of
such employee.28
To enforce these provisions, “[t]he Act creates a private right of
action to seek both equitable relief and money damages ‘against any
employer (including a public agency)’ that ‘interfere[s] with,
restrain[s], or den[ies] the exercise of’ FMLA rights.”29 By detailing
that “any employer” includes a “public agency,” Congress explicitly
sought to make the Act enforceable against the states despite their
sovereign immunity.30
Congress detailed its “[f]indings and purposes” in section 2601
of the Act, which helped justify its decision to abrogate state
immunity and explain its reasoning behind passing the FMLA.31
Specifically, Congress declared that “employment standards that
apply to one gender only have serious potential for encouraging
employers to discriminate against employees and applicants for
employment who are of that gender.”32 To combat this and its other
findings, Congress expressed that one of the Act’s purposes was “to
promote the goal of equal employment opportunity for women and
men.”33
B. Constitutionality
The Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution grants the states
sovereign immunity from suits for damages brought under federal
law.34 However, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives
Congress the power to enforce the substantive guarantees of Section
28. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2006), declared unconstitutional in part by Coleman v. Court of
Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012).
29. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724 (2003) (citations omitted)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2) and § 2615(a)(1)).
30. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1333 (plurality opinion).
31. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601.
32. Id. § 2601(a)(6).
33. Id. § 2601(b)(5).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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1 of that Amendment—the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses.35 This enforcement power means Congress can pass
legislation that either remedies or deters violations of rights
guaranteed by Section 1.36 Such legislation can be enforced against
the states if Congress both (1) makes “its intention to abrogate [the
states’ sovereign immunity] unmistakably clear in the language of
the statute”37 and (2) tailors the legislation “to remedy or prevent
conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive
provisions.”38
In order to evaluate the second requirement, the Supreme Court
developed a “congruence and proportionality” test in City of Boerne
v. Flores.39 The test requires (1) identifying the “evil or wrong that
Congress intended to remedy” or prevent40 and (2) assessing “the
means Congress adopted to address that evil.”41 Legislation passes
the test if there is “congruence and proportionality between the injury
to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”42
In Hibbs, the Supreme Court applied the congruence and
proportionality test to the FMLA’s family-care provisions.43 The
Court looked at the evidence of gender discrimination in order to
determine what harm Congress was attempting to remedy.44 By
framing the constitutional harm as the “pervasive sex-role stereotype
that caring for family members is women’s work,” the Court found
that the first Boerne step was met.45 The Court noted that Congress
had evidence that state employers were as guilty of succumbing to
the sex-role stereotype as private employers.46 This alone, it
reasoned, was enough to justify “Congress’ passage of prophylactic

35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5; Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1333.
36. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1333.
37. Id. (quoting Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
38. Id. (quoting Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 639 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
40. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1333 (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank., 527 U.S. at 639) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
41. Id. at 1334 (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520).
42. Id. (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520).
43. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 737 (2003).
44. See id. at 729.
45. Id. at 731, 737 (citing Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001)).
46. See id. at 729.
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§ 5 legislation.”47 But the Court then continued its analysis by
looking specifically at the maternity-leave provision and found that
the disparate treatment in leave policies further evidenced the
widespread stereotype.48 The Court held that the FMLA family-care
provisions satisfied the last step in the Boerne test because the
“across-the-board, routine employment benefit for all eligible
employees . . . ensure[d] that family-care leave would no longer be
stigmatized as an inordinate drain on the workplace caused by female
employees, and that employers could not evade leave obligations
simply by hiring men.”49 Additional restrictions on the applicability
of the Act caused the Court to find that the FMLA was sufficiently
tailored to the “targeted violation.”50
IV. RATIONALE OF THE COURT
The Supreme Court issued four opinions in Coleman. Justice
Kennedy authored the plurality opinion, which only three Justices
joined.51 Justice Ginsburg authored the dissent, which also had three
Justices join.52 Justice Thomas, who joined the plurality opinion,
authored a concurrence, while Justice Scalia authored an opinion
concurring only in the judgment.53
A. The Plurality Opinion
The plurality began with a synopsis of Hibbs, explaining that the
Supreme Court had “permitted employees to recover damages from
states for violations of [the FMLA’s family-care provisions].”54 It
thereby reaffirmed the early finding of the Hibbs Court that

47. Id. at 730.
48. Id. at 731.
49. Id. at 737.
50. Id. at 739–40. Additional restrictions include that the act “requires only unpaid leave”; is
applicable “only to employees who have worked for the employer for at least one year and
provided 1,250 hours of service within the last 12 months”; excludes from coverage “employees
in high-ranking or sensitive positions, . . . state elected officials, their staffs, and appointed
policymakers”; and mandates that “[t]he damages recoverable are strictly defined and measured
by actual monetary losses, and the accrual period for backpay is limited.” Id. (citations omitted).
51. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1332 (2012) (plurality opinion).
The Chief Justice, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito joined in the plurality opinion. Id.
52. Id. at 1339 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer joined with the dissent in full, and
Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan joined Justice Ginsburg’s dissent with the exception of
footnote one. Id.
53. Id. at 1338 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
54. Id. at 1334 (plurality opinion).
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“Congress [had] relied upon evidence of a well-documented pattern
of sex-based discrimination in family-leave policies,” which included
facially discriminatory policies and facially neutral policies that were
administered in a gender-biased way.55 Both practices “reflected
what Congress found to be a ‘pervasive sex-role stereotype that
caring for family members is women’s work.’”56 Justice Kennedy
framed the Hibbs decision as “conclud[ing] that requiring state
employers to give all employees the opportunity to take family-care
leave was ‘narrowly targeted at the faultline between work and
family—precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has been and
remains strongest.’”57
The plurality opinion then rejected three arguments that
Coleman presented to justify why Congress had the power to
abrogate states’ sovereign immunity when it passed the self-care
provision of the FMLA.58
First, the plurality rejected that “[t]he self-care provision
standing alone addresses sex discrimination and sex stereotyping.”59
It could not find any basis for concluding that sick-leave policies
were facially discriminatory or administered in a discriminatory way,
nor did it believe there was any evidence of a stereotype that women
take more sick leave than men.60 The Court found that Congress’s
intent in passing the self-care provision did not relate to gender;
rather, Congress was concerned about discrimination based on illness
and the economic hardships families faced with illness-related job
loss.61
Second, the plurality did not agree that “the [self-care] provision
[was] a necessary adjunct to the family-care provisions” sustained in
Hibbs.62 Coleman had argued that without the self-care provision,
employers would assume that women would take more family-care
leave and would thereby have an incentive to hire men over
women.63 He urged that the self-care provision was an attempt to

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id. (quoting Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003)).
Id. (quoting Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738).
See id. at 1334–37.
Id. at 1334.
Id.
Id. at 1335.
Id.
Id.
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remedy the discrimination in hiring that would result from the
enactment of the family-care provisions, rather than an attempt to
remedy discrimination in the leave policies.64 The plurality rejected
this argument because “Congress [had] made no findings, and
received no specific testimony, to suggest the availability of self-care
leave equalizes the expected amount of FMLA leave men and
women will take,” and because the argument could not pass the
Boerne test.65
Third, the plurality rejected Coleman’s argument that the selfcare provision served to help single parents keep their jobs when
they became ill.66 The plurality declared that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not protect against this suggested evil.67 This was
true even if most single parents were women because the provision at
most attempted to remedy “employers’ neutral leave restrictions
which have a disparate effect on women.”68 Disparate impact alone
is insufficient to prove a constitutional violation.69 The plurality,
therefore, held that the self-care provision, under this rationale, was
“out of proportion to its supposed remedial or preventative
objectives.”70
The plurality concluded that Congress had no authority to
abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity when it passed the self-care
provision of the FMLA.71 It noted, though, that the immunity only
applied to suits for money damages.72 Individuals can still sue state
employers for violations of the FMLA. While individuals cannot
recover money damages, they may get their jobs back.73
Additionally, the plurality noted that a state “may waive its immunity
or create a parallel state law cause of action.”74

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See id.
Id. at 1335–36.
See id. at 1337.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82 (2000)).
Id. at 1338.
Id.
See id. at 1337–38.
Id. at 1338.
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B. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent would have held that the self-care provision “validly
enforce[d] the right to be free from gender discrimination in the
workplace” and was a valid exercise of Congress’s power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.75 The dissenting Justices
found that two distinct justifications supported this conclusion.76
Under the dissent’s primary rationale, the self-care provision
was directed at sex discrimination because it sought to protect
pregnant women.77 Justice Ginsburg cited the legislative history,
including the competing political views, to show that there was
conflict even among feminists in how to frame laws (such as the
FMLA) to ensure that women’s rights were protected without
singling women out.78 The dissent found that Congress attempted to
resolve this conflict by creating the self-care provision, which
protected pregnant women without treating them differently than
anyone else with a disability.79 Justice Ginsburg further argued that
“pregnancy discrimination is inevitably sex discrimination,” a
conclusion that she argued the Court was wrong to deny roughly
forty years earlier in Gedulig v. Aiello.80 Finally, the dissent reasoned
that the self-care provision was congruent and proportional to
protecting women from pregnancy discrimination because it
separated gender-neutral parental care from the female-only
disability that follows childbirth.81 Furthermore, the provision was
necessary to protect women who needed more leave than sick-leave
plans provided because their pregnancies were exceptionally taxing
or they needed to recover from a miscarriage or a stillborn
childbirth.82 The inclusion of all disabilities, rather than only
pregnancy did not “mean that the provision lack[ed] the requisite
75. Id. at 1339 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
76. See id. at 1339–47.
77. Id. at 1340.
78. Id. Women’s rights advocates were split into two groups: “equal-treatment” feminists
and “equal-opportunity” feminists. Id. Equal-treatment feminists wanted laws that did not
distinguish between men and women. Id. Equal-opportunity feminists wanted laws that would
overcome the burdens placed on women. Id.
79. Id. at 1340–41.
80. Id. at 1345. In Gedulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974), the Court concluded that
discrimination on basis of pregnancy is not sex discrimination because an entire class of females
would never become pregnant. Justice Ginsburg roundly criticized Aiello’s rationale and argued
that the Court should have expressly repudiated it. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1345, 1347 & n.6.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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congruence and proportionality to the identified constitutional
violations” because Congress had ample evidence that singling out
pregnancy would result in gender discrimination in hiring.83
Second, the dissent believed that the Court could have held that
the self-care provision validly applied to states because it prevented
the gender discrimination in hiring that would necessarily have
followed had the self-care provision not been included in the
FMLA.84 Congress was attempting to alleviate the stereotype that
“caring for family members is women’s work.”85 Employers viewed
the passage of the parental and family-care provisions as women’s
benefits.86 Therefore, without the self-care provision, the FMLA
would lead employers to view men as more favorable job
candidates.87 The dissent thus found the self-care provision necessary
to “lessen the risk that the FMLA would give rise to the very sex
discrimination it was enacted to thwart.”88
Overall, Justice Ginsburg could not separate the self-care
provision from the parental- and family-care provisions.89 The
FMLA, in her opinion, was a total package designed to provide
women with both equal opportunity and equal treatment in the
workplace.90 The focus on gender discrimination in the Act made it a
valid exercise of Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.91
C. The Concurring Opinions
The concurring Justices were not concerned with the nuances of
how the self-care provision related to gender discrimination.92 In
their views, it was irrelevant to analyzing Congress’s power in this
instance.93 Justice Thomas believed that “Hibbs was wrongly
decided” because Congress did not have sufficient evidence of a
83. Id. at 1346.
84. Id. at 1347–48 (quoting Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731 (2003)).
85. Id. at 1347 (quoting Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731).
86. Id.
87. Id. 1347–48.
88. Id. at 1349.
89. See id. at 1350.
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 1338 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1338–39 (Scalia, J. concurring in the
judgment).
93. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring); id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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“demonstrated pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the
States” when it passed the family-care leave provisions, and there
was even less evidence concerning the self-care leave provision.94
Justice Scalia argued that the Boerne test is arbitrary and unhelpful.95
He believed that the plurality and dissent each applied the test
faithfully, yet their vastly different conclusions evinced the
uselessness of the test.96 Instead, Justice Scalia would limit
Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 enforcement power to
legislation that enforces the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
as those provisions were envisioned when the Fourteenth
Amendment
was
passed—legislation
concerning
racial
discrimination alone.97
V. ANALYSIS
The self-care provision of the FMLA must pass the Boerne test
in order for the Court to consider it a valid abrogation of the states’
sovereign immunity. The first step requires identifying the
unconstitutional behavior that Congress was attempting to prevent.98
The second step assesses the law to determine if it is “congruent and
proportional” to achieving its goal.99
A. The Self-Care Provision Actually Attempts to
Prevent Employment Discrimination
The plurality in Coleman ignored the predominant theme that
permeates both the Hibbs analysis and the Act’s congressional
findings and purposes in concluding that there was no nexus between
gender discrimination and the FMLA’s self-care provision.100 The
94. Id. at 1338 (Thomas, J., concurring).
95. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
96. Id.
97. See id. at 1338–39; Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 557–58 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
98. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997).
99. See id. at 520.
100. Compare Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1337 (plurality opinion) (stating there is no nexus
between gender discrimination and the self-care provision), with 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006) (stating
that a purpose of the Act is to “minimize[] the potential for employment discrimination on the
basis of sex by ensuring generally that leave is available for [an] eligible medical reason . . . on a
gender-neutral basis”), Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003) (stating
that employers relied on stereotypes about the allocation of family duties because they were so
deeply rooted), Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1347–48 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (identifying public
employers that admitted they would discriminate in hiring if only required to grant parental
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theme in both was that the Act was attempting to overturn the
“pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for families is women’s
work.”101 The plurality took from Hibbs only that Congress had
found evidence that family-leave policies differentiated or were
administered differently based on sex.102 However, Hibbs had arrived
at this conclusion by focusing on the overarching stereotype that
Congress was trying to stifle.103 By ignoring the end goal of the
FMLA, the plurality could also ignore the strong evidence that the
self-care provision was necessary for the family-care provisions to
work.104
Justice Ginsburg, who was in the majority in Hibbs, did not miss
this sleight of hand.105 Her dissent began with the admonition that
“the plurality undervalues the language, purpose, and history of the
FMLA, and the self-care provision’s important role in the statutory
scheme.”106 She also declared that “the plurality underplays the main
theme of our decision in Hibbs.”107 Then, she detailed the competing
agendas of women’s rights activists (equal-treatment feminists and
equal-opportunity feminists) that influenced the final scope of the
FMLA.108
However, in her primary rationale, Justice Ginsburg digressed
from this foundation and instead focused on the self-care provision
as a remedy for pregnancy discrimination.109 Her attempt to hinge
the self-care provision on pregnancy discrimination was simply too
great a stretch. First, it required making the leap that disability meant
pregnancy. Then, it required making the additional leap that
pregnancy could be equated with the female gender to arrive at the
conclusion that the self-care provision, which proscribed
discrimination based on disability, actually proscribed discrimination
based on sex.
leave), and S. REP. NO. 101-77, at 32 (1989) (“Legislation solely protecting pregnant women
gives employers an economic incentive to discriminate against women in hiring policies;
legislation helping all workers equally does not have this effect.”).
101. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 731.
102. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1335–38 (plurality opinion).
103. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729.
104. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1336–38.
105. See id. at 1339–40 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1340.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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Although the dissent presents a valid argument, it suffers from
defective logic because it is based on false premises.110 The first
premise is clearly underinclusive because there are a number of
disabilities other than pregnancy. The second premise is somewhat
less obvious, but is nonetheless underinclusive. Although only
females may get pregnant, not all females will or even can get
pregnant. In other words, there is an entire class of females that will
never be in the class defined by pregnancy—a fact the Supreme
Court recognized thirty-eight years earlier in Aiello.111 It is
unfortunate that Justice Ginsburg went down this road because her
alternative argument is far more persuasive; however, as it stands,
that argument is underdeveloped and gets lost in the dissenting
opinion.
Although the dissent attempted to take the congressional
findings a bit further than they can logically go, the dissent caught
what the plurality missed (or ignored).112 Indeed, it would be hard to
miss unless one purposely tried to ignore it.113 Congress listed its
findings and purposes in the text of the statute.114 The list was neither
long nor confusing, and it included six findings and five purposes for
enacting the FMLA.115 Express in those findings and statements of
purpose was a clear congressional intent “to promote the goal of
equal employment opportunity for women and men.”116
It is clear from the congressional record that the self-care
provision was an attempt to proscribe the employment discrimination
that would result if the FMLA was enacted with only the family-care

110. NICHOLAS CAPALDI, THE ART OF DECEPTION 96–97 (1987).
111. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974).
112. Compare Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1337 (plurality opinion) (“There is nothing in particular
about self-care leave . . . that connects it to gender discrimination.”), and id. at 1347–48
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that Congress adduced evidence that employers would
regard required parental and family-care leave as a woman’s benefit), with 29 U.S.C. § 2601
(2006) (stating that a purpose of the FMLA was to “minimize[] the potential for employment
discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring generally that leave is available . . . on a genderneutral basis”), Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (“The FMLA aims
to protect the right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace.”), and S. REP.
NO. 101-77, at 32 (1989) (“Legislation solely protecting pregnant women gives employers an
economic incentive to discriminate against women in hiring policies; legislation helping all
workers equally does not have this effect.”).
113. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601.
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. Id.
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provisions.117 As the Court recognized in Hibbs, Congress was well
aware of the stereotype that family care was a woman’s job.118 If
Congress knew that the stereotype was prevalent, then there was
ample reason for Congress to believe that employers would
determine that an Act with only a family-care provision was a benefit
only for women.119
The plurality’s error lies in its attempt to subject the self-care
provision to the same analysis the Court used in Hibbs to analyze the
family-care provisions, as though the provisions could be evaluated
in the same way.120 Of course the self-care provision would fail if
evaluated under the same criteria as the family-care provisions.
Congress passed the family-care provisions to remedy gender
discrimination and the self-care provision was passed to prevent it.121
Both entitle Congress to invoke its Section 5 power to abrogate the
states’ sovereign immunity, but they cannot be evaluated in the same
way.122 For example, the Court cannot require Congress to adduce
evidence of an established pattern of gender discrimination by the
FMLA when it comes to hiring post-FMLA.123 There will not be a
pattern of gender discrimination to adduce when Congress has not
passed the law that will create it.
Instead, the Court should have used the Hibbs analysis as a
starting point for what the Court had already determined regarding
congressional findings and purposes. Then, the Court could have
applied the congruence and proportionality test to determine if there
was a sufficient nexus between the self-care provision and the
potential for employment discrimination as a result of the familycare provisions. If Hibbs were used in this way, there would have
been no denying that Congress had sufficient “reason to believe” that
it was preventing unconstitutional behavior when it passed the self117. Id. § 2601(b)(4)–(5).
118. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729 (2003).
119. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1347–48 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
120. The plurality at one point calls both the family-care and the self-care provisions
preventive. Id. at 1336 (plurality opinion).
121. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(6).
122. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529–30 (1997).
123. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1337 (plurality opinion) (“But States may not be subject to suits
for damages based on violations of a comprehensive statute unless Congress has identified a
specific pattern of constitutional violations by state employers.” (citing City of Boerne, 521 U.S.
at 532)).
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care provision.124 The Court could also have relied on the Hibb
Court’s reasoning that the limited applicability of the Act made it
sufficiently tailored.125 The dissent pointed out this approach, but
unfortunately it lost credibility when it attempted to equate the selfcare provision to a remedy for pregnancy discrimination.126
B. The Self-Care Provision Is
Congruent and Proportional to Its Goal
of Preventing Employment Discrimination
The plurality summarily concluded that the self-care
provision—as a preventative measure for the inevitable employment
discrimination that would result from a FMLA that only included a
family-care provision—could not come close to passing the Boerne
test.127 The dissent, by reiterating Congress’s findings regarding the
probable discrimination and outlining the law’s restrictions, declared
that it passed the test.128 Since neither the plurality nor the dissent
compared this theory to other cases in which the Court had applied
Boerne’s congruent and proportionality test, an analysis is in
order.129 A quick look at four cases that applied the test to other laws
in which Congress sought to abrogate states’ sovereign immunity
reveals that the self-care provision indeed should have passed the
test.
First, in Boerne, the Court held that Congress exceeded its
Section 5 power when it passed the Religious Freedom and
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).130 The RFRA prohibited the
“‘[g]overnment’ from ‘substantially burden[ing]’ a person’s exercise
of religion even if the burden result[ed] from a rule of general
applicability unless the government can demonstrate the burden
‘(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2)
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
government interest.’”131 The expansive nature of the RFRA
“ensure[d] intrusion at every level of government” and was “so out
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532.
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738–40 (2003).
See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1340 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1336 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 1345–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1336 (plurality opinion); id. at 1345–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
Id. at 515–16 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993)).

Winter 2013]

FREE TO DISCRIMINATE

771

of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventative object that it
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,
unconstitutional behavior.”132 The legislation put so high a burden on
states that the Court held that Congress had attempted to make
substantive changes in constitutional protections, rather than pass
preventive legislation.133 Here, the self-care provision is not
expansive.134 It reaches only employers that have eligible employees,
and it requires them to provide medical leave only for a documented
disability and for only the number of days that the person’s doctor
proscribes, not to exceed twelve weeks.135 This is far from the vast
intrusion of the RFRA.
Second, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,136 the Court held
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)137
was not a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power to abrogate
states’ immunity. The ADEA targeted age discrimination.138 Age is
not a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause and age
discrimination does not violate “the Fourteenth Amendment if the
age classification . . . is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.”139 The ADEA was not congruent and proportional to
remedy or prevent unconstitutional behavior because its target—age
discrimination—is reviewed for rational basis and the behavior is
often found to be constitutional.140 Unlike the ADEA, which targets
an unprotected class, the FMLA targets gender, a protected class.141
The aim of the self-care provision, then, is at primarily
unconstitutional behavior—gender discrimination in employment as
a result of the pervasive stereotype that would cause employers to
view the family-care provisions as a benefit for women only.142
Third, in United States v. Morrison,143 the Court held that a
federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence was
132. Id. at 532.
133. Id.
134. See Coleman 132 S. Ct. at 1346–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
136. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
137. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2006).
138. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66.
139. Id. at 83.
140. See id. at 82–83.
141. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1349 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
142. Id. at 1347.
143. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).

772

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:755

not a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 5 power.144 Congress
passed the law in order to combat the pervasive bias against these
victims in state justice systems.145 The law targeted unconstitutional
behavior; however, it was not congruent and proportional to this goal
because the law’s consequences affected the perpetrators of the
violence, rather than the perpetrators of the bias.146 In contrast, the
self-care provision targets employers, and the consequences affect
employers.147
Finally, in Tennessee v. Lane,148 the Court held that Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act was a valid exercise of
Congress’s Section 5 power.149 Title II was aimed at the “pervasive
unequal treatment in the administration of state services and
programs.”150 Title II reached a broad range of conduct and could
potentially have vast applicability, but it was nonetheless congruent
and proportional to the harm it sought to remedy because it required
states only to make reasonable modifications and “only when the
individual seeking modification [was] otherwise eligible for the
service.”151 Although Congress did not phrase the self-care provision
to require only “reasonable” leave, it provided restrictions that
effectuate the reasonableness of the requirement. Employers are
required only to provide medical leave for a documented disability,
only for the number of days that the person’s doctor prescribes, not
to exceed twelve weeks, and only for employees that meet eligibility
requirements.152
Comparing the Court’s holdings in these cases provides ample
support that the Court could and should have held that the self-care
provision was congruent and proportional to the goal of preventing
the inevitable gender discrimination that would result from passing
the FMLA with the family-care provisions alone.

144. Id. at 627.
145. Id. at 619.
146. Id. at 626.
147. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2006), declared unconstitutional in part by Coleman v. Court of
Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012).
148. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
149. Id. at 533–34.
150. Id. at 524.
151. Id. at 532.
152. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1346–47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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V. CONCLUSION
The family-care provisions of the FMLA were framed to ensure
equal treatment of women in the workplace. But without the self-care
provision, the FMLA would have likely resulted in unequal
opportunity for women. Gender discrimination in treatment and
opportunity are both violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
would make legislation remedying each a valid exercise of
Congress’s Section 5 power if done in a congruent and proportional
manner. The plurality dismissed this argument, stating that
“Congress must rely on more than abstract generalities to subject the
States to suits for damages.”153 But the stereotype was neither
abstract nor general. The plurality needed to look no further than the
Court’s decision in Hibbs.154 The congressional findings that the
Hibbs Court confirmed were enough to uphold the self-care
provision, as were the additional findings that Justice Ginsburg
illuminated in the dissent.155 But, the plurality characterized these
findings as a “few fleeting references.”156 Because of this
characterization, states cannot be subject to suits for money damages
when they violate the FMLA’s self-care provision. Accordingly,
there is no financial incentive for states to adhere to the self-care
provision, which will encourage them to discriminate when hiring.
Post-Coleman, states are free to violate the self-care provision, a
provision that applies equally to men and women. On the other hand,
there is a cost to violations of the family-care provisions, provisions
that stereotypically apply to women only. Thus the states now have a
financial incentive to discriminate in hiring, and the opportunities for
women will accordingly become unequal when it comes to public
employment. Because this result completely thwarts the very purpose
of the FMLA, the Coleman plurality got it wrong.

153. Id. at 1337 (plurality opinion).
154. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729–30 (2003) (finding that (1) states
had laws based on the belief that “a woman is, and should remain, ‘the center of home and family
life’”; (2) states felt withholding women’s opportunities were justified; (3) state gender
discrimination had not ceased as a result of previous legislation; and (4) the gender discrimination
was a result of “reliance on such stereotypes” (quoting Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961)).
155. Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1339–50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 1336 (plurality opinion) (quoting Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 644 (1999)).
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